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ABSTRACT This article examines political founding in an internet age.Drawing on Hannah
Arendt and Harold Innis, the article considers the 2011 Egyptian revolution in light of three
features of founding: the problems posed by beginning, authority, and appearance. It finds
that death narratives, acceleration, and a personalized media dynamic complicated the
Egyptian effort, but that new forms of visibility may prove promising.
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RÉSUMÉ Cet article examine la fondation politique à l’ère d’internet. S’inspirant d’Hannah
Arendt et d’Harold Innis, il considère la révolution égyptienne de 2011 par rapport à trois
caractéristiques de la fondation, à savoir les problèmes posés par le commencement,
l’autorité et l’apparence. L’article constate que les narrations sur la mort, l’accélération, et une
dynamique personnalisée des médias ont compliqué l’effort égyptien, mais que de nouvelles
formes de visibilité pourraient s’avérer prometteuses.
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Introduction  
When it comes to political founding, major analyses tend to focus on the great revolu-
tions of the eighteenth century—the American and French in particular (Arendt, 1963;
Burke, 1986). These examples supply a rich basis for considering the challenges and
dangers of revolution, as well as the elusive dynamics of founding, but they are con-
strained in one important regard. By looking at founding in any given era, we see it
work through particular media dominant at the time. In the case of eighteenth-century
revolutions, this means writing and printing in the form of early newspapers and pam-
phleteering. Today, revolution is facilitated by and expressed through the internet and
social media.1 Might this change in communications habits influence the dynamics of
revolution and the foundings they aim at? And could such change translate into
changed prospects for freedom and stability in the wake of the founding moment?
The connection between communications and political founding plays an impor-
tant role in Hannah Arendt’s (1963) On Revolution because the sharing of words and
deeds in an intimate and bounded setting forms the basis of our political and moral
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lives. What saved the American Revolution from absolutism, she says, was having its
roots in the small, face-to-face “self-governing bodies” of the early colonies held to-
gether “solely by the strength of mutual promise” (p. 156). If, as this view suggests,
our communications habits are linked to our moral prospects, then we must take se-
riously the implications of any change in our dominant media.
Like Arendt, Harold Innis believed communications help shape the prospects for
freedom and humane politics, although not in a deterministic way (Frost, 2003; Noble,
1999). The effect, he thought, was due to the “bias” (Innis, 1991, p. 64) of a medium
toward either time or space. Non-durable but portable space-biased media favours em-
pires and centralized authority, while time-biased media, with its localized effect and
longevity, fosters religion and decentralization (Innis, 1991). If you lean too far in either
direction, society risks rigidities that imperil freedom and invite brutality.
Innis’ work helps flesh out the communications dynamics identified in Arendt’s
thinking. The small councils she admired in the American colonies would, for Innis,
be inherently linked with script writing as a medium of communication—an intensely
collaborative effort that retains many face-to-face oral patterns with their qualities of
longevity and social interaction. So while Arendt’s commentary on revolution suggests
that the social habits of a population set the scene for either a stable or chaotic transi-
tion to founding, Innis shows why these relations need to be grounded in a commu-
nications order that favours human-paced engagement. The prospects for political
founding, it seems, are tied to our communications environment.
But do these theories hold true in the new world of digital communications?
Because it puts them to the test in an extreme way, the “Arab Spring” highlights the
relationship between communications and revolutionary founding. Indeed the rapid
destabilization of the region is a lesson in the unprecedented reach of new media. This
article takes its reference case from the middle of this period, involving one of the
largest and best-documented revolutionary movements—that of Egypt. The timing
of this uprising allowed plenty of opportunity for digital media to make its mark on
events and as one observer insists, “If this wasn’t a ‘social media revolution,’ there is
no such thing” (Faris, 2013, p. 176).
The article begins by considering a “new narrative,” credited to the Arab Spring,
concerning the potency of a young, digitally enabled population to initiate change
(Brym, Godbout, Hoffbauer, Mendard, & Huiquan Zhang, 2014; Hofheinz, 2011),
and finds it reveals little about prospects for founding. To identify what founding
requires, the second section of this article turns to Arendt’s work on the American
Revolution, where communication practices set the stage for a new beginning. The
third section then examines key Arendtian issues of time, authority, and appearance
through an Innisian lens and suggests these requirements may be harder than ever
to navigate. The fourth section examines these factors in the Egyptian context,
where it seems digital media may drive us further from achieving the delicate bal-
ance between stability and freedom required for healthy politics, yet because it in-
troduces new forms of visibility, may also have emancipatory promise. The article
concludes by suggesting one way to approach the challenges of founding is through
conscious media diversification.
Tweeted revolution
In his 2010 New Yorker piece entitled “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be
Tweeted,” Malcolm Gladwell suggested social media’s weak ties were suited only to shal-
low pursuits focused on the needs of a privileged technological elite. Regardless, a chain
of events taken as spurring on revolution in Egypt had its roots in social media. When
a Tunisian fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, self-immolated on December 17, 2010, ac-
counts of his suffering and death—including graphic images of his injuries—circulated
quickly. Some maintain the circulation was primarily thorough television (Alterman,
2011), although others argue that the rapid speed of reaction places the internet at the
origins of the Arab Spring (Faris, 2013; Halverson, Ruston, & Trethewey, 2013). In Egypt,
social media again played a role in memorializing the death of a young man, Khaled
Said, beaten to death by Egyptian police in June 2010. A disturbing cellphone photo of
Said’s corpse inspired a popular Facebook page, although no protesting reached the
level of the Tunisian unrest until early the following year.2 Prompted in part by events
in Tunisia, a protest against policing abuses was called for January 25 in Tahrir Square,
and notice of the movement spread through social media and texting.
Thus began the central period of the revolution: eighteen days of popular protest,
army crackdowns, and the ebb and flow of internet activism and censorship (including
regime efforts to disable internet and cellular communications), at the end of which
President Hosni Mubarak was removed by the Egyptian Army. Throughout this period
the internet was used by both sides but not always in predictable ways. Protesters used
it to raise awareness and organize resistance, but also to conceal their actions through
misinformation. The authorities turned to the internet to anticipate protest activities
and identify activists both before and after the uprising (El-Hibri, 2014; Herrera, 2014).
Undaunted, utopianists find inspiration in the Egyptian experience, and maintain that
even if occasionally used for surveillance and misinformation, the medium “cannot
help” but favour “public speech … collective action … and instantaneous access to
information, communication and organization” (Browning, 2013, p. 71).
Some commentators suggest it is a mistake to view the events in Tahrir Square as
stand-alone phenomena, since they were deeply conditioned by what went before.
The groundwork was laid through years of social suffering and economic stagnation,
as well as a series of movements and mobilizations committed to change (Aouragh &
Alexander, 2011; Hirst, 2012; Winckler, 2013). Yet even if change was fomenting, there
are questions to be asked about why 2011 constituted the tipping point, and what, if
any, influence it had on the overall trajectory of change.
Before attributing the revolution to social media, scholars recommend we “inter-
pret its role with great caution” since it is “unclear just how important” it really was
(Brym et al., 2011, pp. 270, 268). There is evidence, for instance, that social media was
a bit player when it came to popular communications. Although it was among the
heavier users in the region, Egypt’s level of internet penetration in 2011 was between
22 percent and 30 percent—relatively modest by global standards.3 And while 84 per-
cent of Egyptians report turning to television to follow events, only 6 percent used
Facebook and less than 1 percent used Twitter and email (Brym et al., 2014), and a re-
markable 93 percent report relying on firsthand communication for their news (Aday,
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Farrell, Freelon, Lynch, Sides, & Dewar, 2013). The effect of social media, it seems, was
largely due to interest from outside the country. Studies found that only 14 percent of
Twitter clicks originated inside Egypt, and only in one in ten tweets (Aday et al., 2013;
Brym et al., 2011).4 Egyptians who did use social media during the revolution were gen-
erally young, middle class, well educated, and politically inexperienced (Howard &
Hussain, 2011; Howard & Parks, 2012), and there were distinct opinion leaders or
“power users” who provided most of the content later retweeted by more “passive”
users (Boyraz, Krishnan, & Catona, 2015, p. 102; see also Lotan, Graeff, Ananny, Gaffney,
Pearce, & Boyd, 2011). Meaning that even at its most influential, social media favoured
a narrow technological elite.
Perhaps the most telling feature of the Egyptian experience when it comes to social
media, however, is that the greatest mobilization happened when the internet was
taken out of the equation. Mubarak’s regime attempted to shut down the internet and
cellular service beginning on January 28 and continuing for several days. Instead of
stalling the revolutionary movement, the measure drove people into the streets through-
out Cairo and Egypt, some in an effort to find out what was going on, others to locate
loved ones who might be in harm’s way (Hassanpour, 2014; Howard & Hussain, 2011).
The shutdown period was both dramatic and short-lived, and the majority of Egyptians
(56%) cite it as a positive development for the uprising (Alterman, 2011). That it is also
taken as evidence of the significance of social media to the revolutionary movement
poses its own puzzle: Why is the resilience, indeed acceleration, of a movement in the
absence of digital media interpreted as evidence of its centrality?
More importantly, is it safe to assume that the wildfire-like mobilization made
possible by digital communications always favours the aims of a revolutionary move-
ment? Some commentators suggest that the events of January 2011 had perverse con-
sequences. While the crisis may have ousted a dictator, they suggest it strengthened
the army (Saleh, 2012), which played the role of champion of the state. In 2013 the
military again stepped in to remove a sitting president (the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Mohammed Morsi) and by all reports remains influential in the new regime (Trager,
2015). Despite high hopes in the wake of the revolution, its net impact, including the
return to authoritarianism with its resulting disillusionment, may have undermined
rather than advanced prospects for democracy (Bhuiyan, 2015; Brown, 2013;
Cavatorta, 2015).
So Gladwell’s prognosis may have missed the mark in an important regard; the
revolution may well be tweeted, but only because disruption is the easy part in social
change. The hard part is forging solidarity around new authority. In which case the
real question concerns the implications of social media for political founding. For as
Arendt (1963) put it, “there is nothing more futile than rebellion and liberation unless
they are followed by the constitution of the newly won freedom” (p. 133).
The roots of successful founding
To understand how the internet and social media might help or hinder political found-
ing we must first get a clearer picture of what founding requires. Hannah Arendt (1963)
was a theorist of both revolution and founding and made a crucial distinction between
the two. The closest thing to a successful modern revolution Arendt identifies in her
work is the American case, and her analysis sheds light on key challenges in the
process. Each must be successfully navigated to ensure a population exits the violent
conditions of revolution in favour of healthy politics. Communications, she suggests,
helps constitute this new beginning by smoothing over otherwise distressing demands
of innovation.
The first challenge is that of beginning itself. Arendt (1971) thought it among the
most dangerous of conceptual challenges, because it brings man close to things “un-
thinkable” (p. 208). There can be an ex nihilo quality to human action that unnerves
participants. The problem, Arendt (1963) explains, is one of disorientation. In essence,
there is too much freedom to this experience and beginning has “nothing whatsoever
to hold on to; it is as if it came out of nowhere in either time or space … it is as though
the beginner had abolished the sequence of temporality itself” (p. 198). We invent
causes other than ourselves largely in an effort to obscure this discomforting quality
from ourselves. But because they seek to displace or diminish our capacity for action-
as-beginning, these substitutes pose the greatest danger to freedom. The challenge,
then, is how to “restart time” (Arendt, 1971, p. 214) without defaulting to unhealthy
forms of authority.
Yet founding, like all politics, requires some kind of authority, or “auctoritas”
(Arendt, 1963, p. 193, italics in original), to stabilize it, and a successful founding is one
that strikes a balance between authority and freedom, although this balance is easily
disturbed. Arendt (1963) believed our natural capacity as beings who begin new things
provides all the authority we really need for politics, although we very rarely recognize
this, and are drawn to absolutes for their soothing qualities. But because they inject
an unreasonable quality into politics they become the roots of our worst brutalities.
She specifically cautions against bringing “the social” (p. 81) into politics, especially
as it concerns poverty, social discrimination, or other forms of human suffering. Social
demands are bottomless, she warned, and will by nature lead to an all-consuming
form of government.
In contrast, the American founders solved the problem of authority through a pe-
culiar but effective form of self-delusion. Their “great good fortune” as she put it, was
their instantaneous “blind worship” (Arendt, 1963, p. 190) of their Roman-revival style
founding documents, which stabilized the process. This is about as close as any people
in the modern era come to recognizing their own hand in beginning. Their experience
suggests one solution to authority is this: beware of “bewitchment,” (Arendt, 1971, p. 115)
by language, but be prepared to fall for a little of it in order to render the process sus-
tainable. The “best we can do” when faced with “the quandary” of founding, she says,
is turn to “legendary tales,” which help us “come to grips with the mysterious” (Arendt,
1971, p. 203).
Given Arendt’s (1958) famous emphasis on the “sharing of words and deeds”
(p. 198) it should come as no surprise that she believes face-to-face political discussion
among the American colonists saved their revolution from inevitable tendencies to ex-
cess. Having the necessary political infrastructure in place as part of colonial self-orga-
nization, meant there was less actual innovation required. But more importantly,
authentic appearance is itself a means of assuring happiness (Arendt, 1958, 1963), and
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this is one of the ends politics should serve. The “actual content of freedom” she ex-
plained, “is participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm” (1963, p. 22).
Such participation is more than merely instrumental; it is an intrinsic form of happiness.
For within the public “space of appearances … freedom can unfold its charms” (Arendt,
1963, p. 23).
In many ways, then, communications lie at the core of a successful founding. They
help stabilize a community by grounding the temporal displacement of the revolu-
tionary process in an intimate, first person setting. And, done right, can yield a kind
of happiness-through-appearance, although it may take blind fortune or willful self-
delusion to see it through. Arendt’s three factors have a parallel in Innis’ theory of com-
munications, where time, space, and authority also frame the contours of a social order. 
The hazards of communications
Innis shares Arendt’s concern with creating stability in an uncertain world, but not
her confidence that innate capacities provide the starting point. Ever fascinated with
the dynamics of change, John Bonnett (2013) likens Innis’ thinking to that of emergent
systems theory, where a buildup of stimuli triggers disruption and eventual adaptation.
Innis recognized that these patterns could go to extremes and believed societies thrive
when an “appropriate tension” (Babe, 2013, p. 36) is maintained between the forces
of space and time that frame human experience. What Bonnett (2013) calls the potent
“edge-of-chaos state” (p. 130) is for Innis (1991) a point at which we should intervene
to restore balance or risk “new forms of savagery” (p. 29). Moderns run this risk, Innis
(1991) believed, through a neglect of time. Fast but ephemeral communications fore-
shorten time, overwhelming any residual time-binding traditions and undermining
the skills needed to manage time well. This “[l]ack of interest in the problems of du-
ration” suggests the necessary balance between time and space is “seriously disturbed”
(p. 76). Time-binding qualities are indeed crucial to humane politics, but the story-
telling and constitutional worship Arendt cites are, for Innis, squarely a function of
habit rather than luck or genius; and habits can be lost. At the root of the American
Revolution, Innis (1991; 2007) sees not Arendt’s small councils, but an embryonic
press industry cultivating short attention spans and volatile politics. The overwhelming
“present-mindedness” (Innis, 1991, p. 62) of the modern psyche led him to conclude
we were losing our capacity to engage time in a way that moderates political excess.
The price we pay for this imbalance is increasingly unhealthy forms of authority.
The sense of reverence and Roman tradition that Arendt sees surrounding the
American Revolution does not, in Innis’ view, survive the founding, and political space
becomes the pretext for empire rather than the context for freedom. With its roots in
the popular press, modern democracy demands simplification, as only easy-to-com-
municate ideas can thrive in a marketplace characterized by speed, limited attention,
and poor thinking. The modern tendency toward absolutism was no accident in Innis’
(1946) view, because absolutes are simply easier. Adaptive traditions that sustained
the ancients are, he thinks, undermined by the kind of constitution writing that is
today seen as the very hallmark of founding, but is really just an escape from the clam-
our of public opinion. Roman tradition cannot be invoked through a written founding
because writing is what undid the genius of Roman law, creating “necessity for revo-
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lution” (Innis, 1991, p. 7). Because, he explains, it ensures “the dead hand of the written
tradition” (2007, p. 80) is “stamped” (1946, p. xiv) on new regimes, constitutionalism
replaces “living growth” with “the dead letter,” (2007, p. 127) leaving societies with
“nothing to worship but the totalitarianism of the modern state” (1946, p. 55).
We can counter this decline by a return to the human scale, but this requires re-
shaping our communications habits. To put it another way, when it comes to appear-
ance in the public sphere, platform matters. Innis believed modern communications
proliferated words and deeds beyond all reasonable scope, while undermining the
common understanding crucial to their meaning (Babe, 2013; Innis, 1946). A surfeit
of words and deeds, unshared, will not produce sustainable politics. Instead, the tradi-
tions he celebrated were those that checked cultural excess—the oral tradition of the
Greeks counterbalanced the explosive influence of writing in the ancient world, while
universities were the last bastion of long-term thinking in modernity (Innis, 1946).
Such traditions shrink the scale of communications and strike a balance between dom-
inance of the eye and the ear. But with the possible exception of the American case,
modern foundings do not unfold in communicative intimacy—they are mass events.
Nor is it as simple as recapturing Innis’ oral tradition, because that described not merely
face-to-face communications but a fecund coexistence of orality alongside writing.
If orality is not a straightforward cure-all, can anything else counter the onslaught
of mechanized communications to make Arendtian appearance possible? Universities
were, Innis believed, “still living and human,” (1991, p. 32) because, as with the Greeks,
“[p]eople had something to say to each other and said it” (1946, p. 67), but he saw the
tradition faltering as they became “one of the kept institutions of capitalism” (1946,
p. 75). The imperative then is to find practices that, because they proceed from the
“search for truth” (Innis, 1946, p. 61), ensure the “avoidance of extremes and extrava-
gance” (Innis, 1946, p. 65). And that means looking for things that counteract or coun-
terbalance unhealthy concentration on any single idiom.
While Innis and Arendt share a sense that communication predisposes us toward
more or less healthy forms of authority, Innis’ work adds an exacting element to the
analysis of founding. Political genius and nostalgia for the ancients may have helped the
American cause along, but these alone cannot outweigh enormous changes in how we
share words and deeds. If Innis is correct, then we have to ask whether changing our
dominant media also changes the prospects for political founding that Arendt identified. 
New media and founding in Egypt
The Egyptian experience allows us to see the three factors of time, authority, and ap-
pearance in a contemporary setting, as well as watch the dynamics of change in action.
It reveals a complex pattern linking politics and communications, some of which
would concern both Arendt and Innis, while others may suggest new potential. 
The problem of time
As with any revolution, the Egyptian resistance faced the problem of beginning. One
commentator described the central period of the Tahrir Square demonstrations as an
“Epiphanic Moment,” or “a time out of time” (Alexander, 2011, p. 53). The difficulty is
the radical freedom of beginning inflicts its own form of suffering, leading to a fascina-
Frost  Arendt and Innis 277
tion with absolutes. There are ways to soften the effects, however. Arendt (1958) opens
one chapter in The Human Condition with a quote from Isaac Dinesen: “all sorrows
can be born if you … tell a story about them” (p. 175). So, one way to ameliorate the
experience of beginning is Dinesen’s solution, tell a story about them.
Something similar appears to have happened in the Egyptian case. The story sur-
rounding the Egyptian uprising and the Arab Spring more generally is rooted in a com-
pelling narrative form, that of tragedy. The senseless deaths of two young men pitted
against authority seem to have provided an absolute point from which the revolution-
ary story unfolds. Notably, Arendt (1958) parallels natality (the capacity for beginning)
with mortality (that we all must die and the world go on without us) as twin limiting
conditions of human existence, making the association of death with political begin-
ning especially potent. She explains: “That every individual life between birth and
death can eventually be told as a story with beginning and end is the pre-political and
pre-historical condition of history” (p. 184, italics added). Even though scholars rightly
point out that the reality is far more complex—that the 2011 uprising had deep roots
in social and political oppression as well as long-term mobilization against it—it is
likely that the revolution needed this narrative to alleviate the responsibilities of be-
ginning by displacing them on to figures who became “martyrs” (Herrera, 2014, p. 107)
to a cause they did not know existed.
Jeffry Halverson, Scott Ruston, and Angela Trethewy (2013) believe that internet
communications made possible the formation of a martyr narrative that strongly
echoed extant North African traditions, and then made its spread fast and furious.
They call efforts, such as the wildly popular Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said,”
“virtual reliquaries” (p. 312). These reliquaries not only drew upon powerful martyr tra-
ditions buried “deep within the Egyptian psyche” (Herrera, 2014, p. 151), but because
they developed online, also took a crucial participatory form that deepened commit-
ment though “communal engagement” (Halverson et al., 2013, p. 327). As Halverson
et al. (2013) point out, the origins of the term martyr, and of its Arabic shahid, both
mean “witness” or one who “testifies to the truth” (p. 322). They explain “[t]he polit-
ical act of death” can be understood as “an act of communication” (p. 323). Moreover
the deaths were “strategically ambiguous enough” (p. 327) to foster “imagined soli-
darity” through “participatory” storytelling (p. 328) and they associate the outcome
with a form of “civil religion” (p. 326). While grounded in very different events, these
dynamics are reminiscent of the “worship” and “pietas” (Roman civil piety) Arendt
(1963, p. 190) associated with the American founding. If true, this martyr element con-
nected revolutionaries to a deep-rooted source of political potency, simultaneously
solving the problem of beginning through evocative narrative and providing an ab-
solute to ignite the process.5
Arendt has been accused of over-emphasizing the power of beginning until it be-
comes an unhealthy absolute that “erases the violence and ambiguity” (Honig, 1991,
p. 107) of our origins. If natality cannot single-handedly authorize founding for this
reason, then death— especially where it involves political martyrdom—cannot either.
But Innis reminds us that the stabilizing effects of time come not from novelty alone
but from situating innovation within a tradition, which suggests an intriguing possi-
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bility. Perhaps it was not death that conveyed political power; perhaps it was the ca-
pacity to evoke an extant tradition, one closely associated with the time-binding qual-
ities of religion and the pursuit of truth. This suggests that while the revolution began
with a troubling mix of events that “broke” time, these events were powerful because
they also held the resources to mend it.
The problem of authority
Dying for a cause can provide a compelling form of narrative to initiate revolutionary
action, but it is a difficult one to sustain in the long-term, and traditionalist themes in
the martyr narrative mean it can be used in reactionary ways (Herrera, 2014). So even
if it soothes the experience of beginning, revolutionaries still need some way to solve
the problem of authority in the long-term. And that means translating the power gen-
erated at the beginning, into prolonged forms of organization.
In the Egyptian case it appears that the revolutionaries, who temporarily gathered
in largely peaceful public demonstration, eventually broke down along lines that fol-
lowed two different sets of concerns. For secularists the happiness of the people was
the first imperative, for Islamists, the role of the Divine provided the authority behind
their actions. The eventual conflict between these two attachments led to the undoing
of the revolutionary movement (Brown, 2013). The secular-religious conflict is hardly
a new one, however, so is there any reason to think this should be linked to living in
an internet age?
That a conflict arose between different forms of absolutes is not a reflection on
the communications used; that the conflict became a deep-seated obstacle to political
progress may be. The debate between techno-pessimists and techno-utopianists has
generally raged over the inherent qualities that a medium imparts to the content and
views that flow over it, such that it favours certain kinds of communication over others.
The issue under contention is whether social media increases political polarization by
encouraging homophily—the tendency of people to gather with others like them, or
form connections among those with similar views.
It is now recognized that early concerns over homophily may be overstated
(Farrell, 2012), so it seems unwarranted to lay the fractious nature of post-revolutionary
politics on social media alone. Innis’ concern with acceleration and centralization sug-
gests another connection, however, one that also appears in Arendt’s (1963) work on
the American case. A critical part of that experience, she suggests, was that it involved
a kind of “hiatus” (1958, p. 197) between the end of one political order and the found-
ing of another, a pause supplied by America’s colonial period (Arendt, 1963). This is
one of the most powerful lessons she draws from the use of political fables. Arendt
(1958) turns repeatedly to Vergil’s Aeneid, which tells the tale of Rome’s founding by
refugees of the Trojan wars, because it details a crucial interlude between the fall of
authority in Troy and its reconstitution in Rome.
When it comes to the temporal qualities of founding a new authority in Egypt,
the difficulty therefore is threefold. First, regardless of whether we consider television
or internet more influential, Egyptians were operating within a communications en-
vironment characterized by pronounced spatial reach, with its bias toward centraliza-
tion and what Innis would consider a neglect of time. Second, the eighteen-day period
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associated with the occupation of Tahrir Square, taken as the central moment of the
revolution, was a brief gap unlikely to meet the requirements Arendt has in mind for
a hiatus. And third, revolutionaries lacked the sustained face-to-face engagement that
builds capacity for political life, which ideally a hiatus period should provide. All of
which suggests the rapid changes made possible in an internet-era revolution compli-
cate the transition to founding. Add to that the expectation that founding requires a
written constitution, and it meant post-revolutionary Egyptians were looking for re-
newal where it could not be found. The methods they turned to—mechanized com-
munications, jurisprudence, and mass politics—are not in themselves noxious, but
they concentrate power that should be diffuse. Innis (1946) stressed active self-mod-
eration over one-sided zeal for any cause saying: “Virtue is the middle way” (p. 65).
Under conditions of runaway acceleration such methods squeeze out time for reflec-
tion, and augment turmoil rather than stability.
This seems to be borne out in the sober analysis now emerging on Egyptian affairs.
Arguing that the failures witnessed in the Egyptian case were not inevitable, Nathan
Brown (2013) suggests that the major obstacle faced in the wake of the revolution was
not a failure to consult the population (they were summoned to the polls on at least
five occasions), it was the general unpreparedness of all parties to form new democratic
traditions. What they lacked was a way to effectively overcome the authoritarian legacy
and forge new rules of engagement. At the same time, founding (or as Brown puts it
“transition”), poses an inevitable paradox, because it calls for careful “design” but in
today’s world:
there is no time-out when politics ceases so that political systems can be
designed in a pristine atmosphere; there is no magic moment when polit-
ical actors put aside their own goals, values, and experiences and stand
aloof from day-to-day political struggles. (p. 56)
So even if successful founding requires a “time-out” or hiatus as Arendt describes, we
are increasingly unlikely to see it (that is, if it was ever really possible outside of colonial
adventures). Instead, the internet feeds a “catalytic spread of unrest” (Howard & Parks,
2012, p. 361) that compresses the collapse and refounding process into a single tight
operation, squeezing out Arendt’s hiatus. As one analyst observed, internet-era com-
munications serve as an “accelerant” on political affairs. And while they cannot sin-
gle-handedly make history happen, they did, in the case of the Egyptian revolution
“make history happen faster” (Browning, 2013, p. 85). Might this explain why Egypt’s
attempts to grapple with the problem of authority have gone so poorly?
The problem of appearance
The third problem Arendt (1958) identifies concerns appearance. Or rather, it might
be more accurate to say that political founding is the solution to the problem of ap-
pearance. This is what politics is constituted for: to create a space within which we can
appear before one another as equals, combining our individual strengths into a form
of common power. Through politics we overcome the challenges inherent in the
human condition by assuring boundedness, continuity, and intelligibility, and provid-
ing a crucial venue for the experience and exercise of freedom. What role, therefore,
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did appearance play in the Egyptian experience, especially in light of the increasing
use of digital communications to mediate that experience?
Perhaps the first thing to note is that Arendt warned against bringing “the social”
into politics. Politics is a radically different kind of space, she argued, and is under-
mined by purely social concerns. What does it mean, then, if one of the roots of the
Egyptian revolution lies in the use of “social” media? There are several reasons to
doubt we can entirely set aside her concerns over the corrupting influence of social
obsessions. First and foremost, social media is premised on the personal identity of
the user, and even if they render it visible to the world, remains rooted in private lives
and tastes. This migration of the private and personal into the realm of the political
troubled Arendt (1963). As she explains:
the demand that everybody display in public his innermost motivation,
since it actually demands the impossible, transforms all actors into hyp-
ocrites; the moment the display of motives begins, hypocrisy begins to
poison all human relations. (p. 88)
Arendt (1963) links this tension to the importance of a certain kind of “persona” re-
quired for the public space, one that recognized that “natural man” (p. 97, italics in
original) was not the true participant figure of politics, but rather the citizen. Any at-
tempt to make personal life the foundation of politics invites extremism, she warns,
for “the light of the world” invariably “distorts the life of the heart” (p. 87).
Moreover the focus on individuality runs counter to the origins of political power. As
she explained in a well-known passage: “The hope for man in his singularity lay in the
fact that not man but men inhabit the earth” (p. 166). Thus getting past our singularity
is a crucial requirement for founding.6 In contrast, social media lends itself to a strange
understanding of the way private preferences amalgamate into public activism. They raise
the idea of a “leaderless” movement (Howard & Hussain, 2011, p. 37) based on “people
power” while in reality fostering a kind of political celebrity Arendt disdained. She writes
scathingly about “the professional revolutionist” whose real profession is cultivating
“Bohemia” as an “island of blessed leisure” (Arendt, 1963, pp. 250–251) based on theory
and analysis. Indeed she saw leadership as a regrettable, albeit inevitable, feature of revo-
lutionary movements (LeJune, 2013). While the uprising generated its own celebrity ac-
tivists, that we take their role seriously is evidence of little more than our own gullibility.
As Innis (1991) succinctly put it, developments in communication that have “made for
greater realism” have also “made for greater possibilities of delusion” (p. 82).
The internet provides a new venue for Arendt’s (1963) “professional revolution-
ists” who for all their study, neither accurately anticipate nor fully understand the phe-
nomenon they champion. As private figures with public profile they become
unavoidably associated with the revolutionary cause, but are unlikely to advance its
most important goals. Social media can provide the leading voices of a revolution, per-
haps even ensure their proliferation, but by virtue of its roots in the private and the
social, its “boho” qualities suggest its potential to contribute meaningfully to (re)found-
ing the political realm is questionable.
Two qualities of internet-age communications might offset this limitation. First,
enhanced capacity for anonymity, and second, widespread engagement. The problem
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is anonymity runs counter to the imperative of appearance. Instead of positing a
healthy form of masking found in “the legal personality” (Arendt, 1963, p. 98) of the
citizen, it suppresses appearance entirely. Worse still, it promises to reveal the natural
man in terms of motives and beliefs, while in reality has made possible new techniques
of deception and fakery (Cook, Waugh, Abdipanah, Hashemi, & Rahman, 2014).
Anonymity of this kind is a long way from what Arendt had in mind.
Likewise the widespread engagement that the internet facilitates may fall below
the bar Arendt sets for political action. One of the things the internet does best is sup-
port emotive states (Howard & Parks, 2012), and its role in “the sharing of grievances”
(Rennick, 2013, p. 157) may have helped lay the groundwork for the Arab Spring. These
participatory capacities prove powerful in the spread of martyr narratives and aligning
discontent, but the same results are not assured in terms of discourse. Mood, while it
may ignite a populace, is not politics in Arendt’s (1963) view. Arendt’s concerns are re-
inforced by Innis’ (1991) view that “mechanized communication” undermined what
we need for beginning new things. “The oral dialectic” he maintained, “ is overwhelm-
ingly significant where the subject matter is human action and feeling and it is impor-
tant in the discovery of new truth” (p. 191). All that modern media offered, in contrast,
was an increase in “cruelty” (p. 191).
There is however, at least one area where internet-age communications might de-
liver the kind of counterweight Innis imagined, and that concerns visibility. There are
reports that authorities hesitated to move on protesters because of the possible pres-
ence of camera-equipped cellphones that could document and broadcast their actions
(Howard & Hussain, 2011). Although it originally appeared alongside writing and print-
ing, imagery, Innis (1946) recognized, adds a distinct dimension to communication
and he relates it to developments in religion rather than administration. If digital media
makes more pervasive use of the visual dimension, could this new dominance of the
eye make a difference? Indeed, being seen is not only a source of happiness but also a
form of accountability, and therefore places our actions within the bounds of a partic-
ular narrative that bears witness to our story (Arendt, 1958). To the extent that they
introduce a pervasive form of witnessing—of each seeing the other’s actions in politics
and knowing our own actions may be likewise observed—cellphones reintroduce a
kind of seeing, and with it a shared sense of appearance. Whether it is sufficient to ad-
dress the problem of appearance that Arendt identifies is not clear, but its role in the
Egyptians conflict is, at the very least, suggestive.
One of the closest connections to Arendt’s work observed in the Egyptian context,
however, relied not on the use of digital communications, but on their absence. The
regime’s attempt to shutdown the internet drove people to gather spontaneously, and
favoured local, face-to-face encounters over high-profile mass events (Hassanpour,
2014). By many accounts this was the turning point for the revolution: when people
took to the streets not to their computers. On the first day of the shutdown, attendance
at Tahrir dropped off steeply in favour of small neighbourhood gathering places. This
decentralization was more difficult to control and may have proved the real undoing
of the regime. As a Human Rights Watch observer reported at the time, the police
could no longer control the crowds, as there were “too many protests in too many places”
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(Hassanpour, 2014, p. 20, italics in original). Ironically, then, the best thing that hap-
pened for the Egyptian revolution may have been the temporary disruption of digital
communications and the widespread surge of engagement that followed; a surge of
participatory power cut short by its rapid reconnection. This poses an interesting pos-
sibility: Could a prolonged “unplugging”—characterized as it was by decentralized,
first-person engagement—have provided something close to the hiatus Arendt rec-
ommends? The dramatic shift from spatial- to time-based communications affirms
the potency Innis assigned to the interaction between media as a requirement for hu-
mane politics. If sustained, might it also provide an opportunity for the development
of new political habits in an otherwise overwhelmed digital world? 
Political founding in an internet age: Absolutist or emancipatory?
Although she never took up the communications question directly, Arendt’s account
of eighteenth-century founding provides a framework for understanding founding in
our own era. She turns our attention to three central problems facing a post-revolu-
tionary populace: those of beginning, authority, and appearance. Harold Innis’ work
shows how these three elements link to our communications habits, affirming the im-
portance of media to healthy politics. Seeing how Egyptians navigated these challenges
in the 2011 revolution therefore tells us something about how internet-age communi-
cations may reshape the landscape for political founding.
First, in the case of beginning, by providing the venue for the “virtual reliquaries”
(Halverson et al., 2013, p. 312) as well as a participatory method of veneration, the in-
ternet and associated media reinvigorated a tradition of martyr narratives. By making
them available as a form of political absolute, this narrative communicates powerfully
and pervasively about the relationship between necessity and freedom, as well as the
capacity for appearance even under desperate conditions. But as with any absolute it
can be a source of both power and abuse, and its potency draws on existing beliefs.
Next, the accelerated pace of revolution and founding may have made the problem of
authority intractable in the Egyptian case. The sheer unpreparedness of the revolu-
tionaries and the absence of any tradition of compromise handicapped efforts from
the start. Without a hiatus in which to address this, the revolution appears to be fol-
lowing a course back to authoritarianism. But this inability to stabilize authority may
not be a uniquely Egyptian problem. Digital communications with its pronounced
space-bias, and weak time-binding traits, sets the stage for volatility. Only a conscious
effort to rebalance our communications habits, including efforts to reinvigorate oral
traditions, can offset these tendencies. Finally, internet-age communications introduce
new forms of appearance. Some fall below Arendt’s standard for political action and
we would be wise to limit our expectations concerning their emancipatory impact. At
the same time, by making the act of witnessing more pervasive some technologies
have political potential, although very little carries the significance or power of face-
to-face communications.
So it appears that social media and digital communications prove useful for the
quick removal of autocrats, but not for long-term process change. The internet may
serve as a “catalyst” for revolution “hastening the disintegration of the status quo”
(Hassanpour, 2014, p. 1), but it shows a mixed record when it comes to supporting
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founding as a process of stabilization. One thing that transcends the communications
setting, however, is Arendt’s imperative that politics must be devoted to political ends
and not something else. The ends to which politics can rightly aim are those of freedom
and appearance in the public space. There is no necessary reason these ends should
be unattainable in an internet age, yet they do require us to occasionally come, quite
literally, face-to-face with our problems—political adversaries included—and nothing
in this analysis suggests a substitute. However much life has accelerated in the digital
age, the Egyptian experience reminds us that an essential requirement for founding
is “taking time” (Lesch, 2014, p. 68).
Yet in the final analysis, while digital communications accelerated the process of
change, it could not single-handedly determine the fate of the revolution, for reasons
that both Arendt and Innis would recognize. No matter how explosive, the new is never
entirely new. It arrives into a context, and existing dynamics help shape future prospects.
So when it comes to founding we should not think of media in essentialized terms.
Instead both thinkers look beyond raw innovation for patterns and practices that make
healthy change possible. It is easy to lose sight of this element in Arendt’s work, given
her love affair with beginning, indeed she may have lost sight of it herself on occasion.
Bringing Innis into the conversation helps ground Arendt’s account and reveals that
the energy of founding arises not just in what we change but also in what we keep.
Moreover, Innis helps us understand why one form of appearance can be more suc-
cessful in founding than another. There is no magic to Arendt’s small councils, although
they did not operate in isolation—an emerging press formed part of the equation. As
with the American case it is easy to misread the Egyptian setting by focusing on digital
media alone, even though time without it may have been the crucial factor. Likewise
the death-driven storytelling it supplied worked not just because tragic imagery fires the
imagination, nor even because storytelling extends over time, but because these partic-
ular narratives connect to surviving truth-telling traditions that still mean something.
Perhaps the most important finding of this exercise is the following: adding Innis’
work to Arendt’s theories reveals a perverse mismatch between the elements we bring
to the challenge of founding in a digital age. We are today at the mercy of media that
drive constant change and celebrate disruption. Media that thrive on what Innis (1946)
called “the intellectual pest of our time—originality” (p. 66) driven, ironically, by in-
sensate exhaustion in an age left numb by its own creativity. Yet digital-age revolutions
are expected to produce written constitutions, steady political habits, and reverence
for fledgling democracy. It is an unlikely combination. Indeed in Innis’ framework, law
appears as a technique of administration more than an expression of freedom, sug-
gesting we are moving further away from the Arendtian vision, and are less likely than
ever to share our words and deeds effectively. But Innis maps the media environment
for one reason: so we can master it, not just suffer it. For this challenge of “regenera-
tion” (Bonnett, 2013, p. 287) we cannot rely on genius, good fortune, or even innate
humanity. Nor on some magical combination of media habits. Instead, finding the
“middle way” though the digital jungle will require continuous, painstaking work to
balance and rebalance our communicative world because, as Innis (1946) warned,
“There are no cures” (p. 65).
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Notes 
The article considers the reach of digital media broadly, as the internet cannot now be effectively1.
distinguished from other communications practices that revolutionaries had at their disposal, including
cellular networks or television (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011).
There is some suggestion that the photo may have been doctored, or that the injuries were sustained2.
post-mortem (Herrera, 2014).
Miriyam Aouragh and Anne Alexander (2011) report penetration rates of 30 percent, while Robert3.
Brym, Melissa Godbout, Andreas Hoffbauer, Gabe Mendard, and Tony Huiquam (2014) report a lower
22 percent. They agree that rates for cellphone use in Egypt (80%) far outstripped internet access. 
Data on usage patterns for various media during the revolution appears in Aday et al., 2013, pp. 6,4.
11-14; and Brym et al, 2014, p. 270.
One Arendt scholar cautions: storytelling should not go so far as to anesthetize us to reality. Instead,5.
for Arendt, “there is virtue in our sorrow” insofar as it provides “an acknowledgement of the enormous
burden of political responsibility” inherent in the violence of revolution (LeJune, 2013, p. 25). This
makes tragedy an especially potent form of narrative.
This migration of the private into the public space is also noted in Ruth Starkman’s work on the6.
Muslim Brotherhood, where she points out that Arendt specifically rejects brotherhood as an appropriate
model for politics on the grounds that it is excessively personal, and indeed, violent. Brotherhood,
Starkman (2013) explains, “remains too volatile a concept for a functioning public sphere” (pp. 601–602).
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